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Abstract
The 2008 financial crisis has been attributed to “excessive complexity” of
the financial system due to financial innovation. We employ computational
complexity theory to make this notion precise. Specifically, we consider the
problem of clearing a financial network after a shock. Prior work has shown that
when banks can only enter into simple debt contracts with each other, then this
problem can be solved in polynomial time. In contrast, if they can also enter
into credit default swaps (CDSs), i.e., financial derivative contracts that depend
on the default of another bank, a solution may not even exist.
In this work, we show that deciding if a solution exists is NP-complete if
CDSs are allowed. This remains true if we relax the problem to ε-approximate
solutions, for a constant ε. We further show that, under sufficient conditions
where a solution is guaranteed to exist, the approximate search problem is PPAD-
complete for constant ε. We then try to isolate the “origin” of the complexity. It
turns out that already determining which banks default is hard. Further, we show
that the complexity is not driven by the dependence of counterparties on each
other, but rather hinges on the presence of so-called naked CDSs. If naked CDSs
are not present, we receive a simple polynomial-time algorithm. Our results are
of practical importance for regulators’ stress tests and regulatory policy.
1 Introduction
The year 2008 has provided a painful example of how moderate losses in a com-
paratively small financial market can spread and amplify in the financial system to
create the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It has since become
widely accepted that this was not just the result of financial institutions’ individual
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risk-taking, but a consequence of the overall architecture of the financial system
at the time. Haldane (2009), then Executive Director of Financial Stability at the
Bank of England, described the crisis as a manifestation of “the behaviour under
stress of a complex, adaptive network,” in which “financial innovation [had] increased
further network dimensionality, complexity, and uncertainty.” Yellen (2013), then
Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve, described regulatory changes after the crisis that
are explicitly targeted at “excessive systemic risk arising from the complexity and
interconnectedness that characterize our financial system.”
The financial system has undergone rapid change since the 1990s. Financial
derivatives (i.e., financial contracts where an obligation to pay depends on some other
event or market variable) today allow to trade and reallocate individual components
of risk. For example, an investment bank may bundle a loan in a foreign currency
with a derivative that will pay the difference between the domestic and the foreign
exchange rate. A domestic investor could then buy the bundle without having to
worry about a devaluation of the foreign currency. Another trader would take on the
other side of the derivative and thus the exchange rate risk. Of course, now both
the bank and the investor depend on the trader meeting her obligation to pay. If
the trader or the investor is another financial institution, the process can continue
over any number of stages, with each party buying, rebundling, and reselling risk.
A network of obligations arises: a graph where the nodes are financial institutions
(“banks” for short) and the edges are financial contracts. We call this the financial
network.
The above accounts by policymakers attribute the financial crisis to excessive
“complexity” of the financial network. The question remains, though, how exactly
we should understand the term “complexity” here. In particular, while a financial
network could arise in a variety of ways,1 most people share an intuition that financial
networks with derivatives are “more complex” than ones without. In this paper,
we will show that this informal notion materializes in the form of computational
complexity of a concrete problem that regulators need to solve.
More in detail, we study the clearing problem. We are given a financial network
consisting of banks and contracts between banks. Each contract defines an obligation
to pay a certain amount of money under certain conditions. We assume that some
of the banks experienced a shock on their assets, which may render them unable
to meet their obligations towards other banks and force them into bankruptcy (or
default). Defaults may trigger defaults of other banks downstream. For each bank,
1Short-term loans between banks and securization, i.e., the pooling and re-selling of debt, are
two other ways how a financial network can form. The products resulting from securization (most
prominently collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)) are sometimes called “derivatives,” but in contrast
to the kinds of derivatives we discuss in this paper, they are defined using a priority structure and do
not depend on any market variable except for the debt they are based on. For the purpose of our
discussion, we therefore consider these products a form of debt.
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we are now looking for its recovery rate, i.e, the percentage of its liabilities the bank
can pay to its creditors. These payments are made from its own (external) assets
and the money it receives from other banks. Recovery rates must be in accordance
with standard bankruptcy regulations, which imply a constraint reminiscent of a flow
identity: defaulting banks must pay out all their assets to creditors and must do so
in proportion to the respective obligation. Banks may further incur default costs and
lose a percentage of their assets upon defaulting. The clearing problem is non-trivial
because the contractual relationships can form cycles in the network.2
The clearing problem serves as a model for how a financial crisis will turn out
following the initial shock. Once a solution to the clearing problem has been found,
the effect of the initial shock can be judged by metrics like the number of defaulted
banks or the total loss of money due to default costs. Researchers have used this
approach to study the effect of network structure on systemic risk, such as financial
diversification and integration (Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014), the interplay of
shock size and network structure (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015), and
to determine bounds on the extent of a crisis (Elsinger, Lehar and Summer, 2006;
Glasserman and Young, 2015), among many others.3
The clearing problem has practical relevance in the context of stress tests, where
regulators such as the European Central Bank (ECB) evaluate the stability of the
financial system under an array of adverse economic scenarios. While today, the
official stress tests still operate at a microprudential (individual bank) level, efforts are
underway to transition to a macroprudential point of view, where the financial system
is considered as a whole (Constâncio, 2017). These new stress tests need to take
network effects into account. For example, the ECB’s STAMP€ framework (Dees,
Henry and Martin, 2017) includes a model for the assessment of interbank contagion
that is very close to the literature on clearing. The clearing problem is solved many
thousands of times in the context of a Monte Carlo simulation. Therefore, these
stress tests crucially depend on having access to efficient algorithms for the clearing
problem.4
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) showed that, if banks can only enter into simple debt
2Perhaps contrary to intuition, cyclic structures are overwhelmingly common in real financial
networks. See D’Errico et al. (2018), for example, for an empirical study of the network structure of
credit default swap markets, which will be discussed below.
3While the exact rules of clearing vary across the literature, they all share as a common feature
that payments (or, in some cases, contract valuations) happen simultaneously and some kind of
input-output identity needs to hold at each bank. The essential properties of these models with
respect to existence and computation of a solution are very similar. In this paper, unless specifically
indicated, the term “clearing” refers to the model by Eisenberg and Noe (2001), discussed below, and
its extensions.
4The size of the financial systems analyzed in stress tests must be expected to lie in the order of
100 banks, making brute-force approaches impractical. For example, Dees, Henry and Martin (2017,
Chapter 12) consider 144 banks and the European Banking Authority (2014) stress tests covered
123 banks. Only few of these banks are trivial, i.e., sources or sinks in the network Dees, Henry and
Martin (2017, Chart 12.1).
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contracts with each other, then the clearing problem always has a solution and it
can be computed in polynomial time. A debt contract is any contract where the
obligation to pay is a fixed number. This could be just a loan from one bank to
another, but it can also serve as a model for, e.g., a derivative when the obligation to
pay only depends on variables that are external to the financial system and that can
assumed to be fixed for the purpose of clearing. Rogers and Veraart (2013) extended
the result to default costs. These clearing models have seen widespread adoption in
research and stress testing, such as in the above-mentioned STAMP€ framework. We
argue, however, that it is necessary to consider extensions of the model, where the
obligation to pay may not be fixed.
Specifically, we study financial networks that contain credit default swaps (CDSs)
in addition to debt. A CDS is a financial derivative where the obligation to pay
depends on the default of a third party, the reference entity. Market participants
use CDSs to insure themselves against a default of the reference entity or to place a
speculative bet on this event. CDSs have played a major role in the default of Lehman
Brothers and the bailout of AIG during the 2008 crisis (Fender and Gyntelberg,
2008). Both firms were among the most important institutions in this market, both
as counterparties and as reference entities (Fitch Ratings, 2007). It has hence become
conventional wisdom that they were counterparties in significant amounts of CDSs
where the respective other bank was the reference entity. Such CDSs on other banks
cannot accurately be modeled as debt contracts because they depend on an event
that is fundamentally endogenous to the financial system. At the same time, future
stress tests cannot afford to neglect the dependencies implied by a Lehman–AIG
type situation. That is why it is necessary to consider an extension of the existing
debt-only to CDSs where reference entities can be other financial institutions.5
We consider such a model that extends the Rogers and Veraart (2013) clearing
model to CDSs in a straightforward way. In our own recent work (Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston, 2019), we have studied existence of a solution in this model.
We have found that there are financial systems where the clearing problem has no
solution. At the same time, the clearing algorithms for debt-only networks do not
extend to CDSs even in cases where a solution is known to exist. This immediately
raises two questions regarding the computational aspects of the clearing problem with
CDSs:
1. Given a financial network, can we efficiently determine whether a solution to
the clearing problem exists?
2. Given a financial network in which a solution is known to exist, can we efficiently
5The market for CDSs on financial firms alone currently has a size of about USD 900 billion.
In the years following the 2008 crisis, this number was as high as USD 5 trillion. See Bank for
International Settlements (2018, Section Single-name instruments, Subsection Financial firms) and
the graph linked there.
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compute it?
In this paper, we answer both questions in the negative. Towards the first question,
we show that it is NP-complete to distinguish networks that have an (exact) solution
from those that have no ε-approximate solution, for a natural approximate solution
concept and sufficiently small constant ε. In particular, deciding existence of an exact
solution or an ε-approximate solution is NP-hard (Section 3).
Towards the second question regarding the computation of a solution, we restrict
our attention to the special case where banks do not incur default costs. Here, it is
known that a solution always exists (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019),
but the only known proof of this statement is non-constructive via a fixed-point
theorem and so the question regarding computation has remained open so far. As
exact solutions can be irrational, we need to consider an approximation problem. We
show that the total search problem of finding an ε-approximate solution in a financial
system without default costs is PPAD-complete if ε is a sufficiently small constant.
Thus, no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists unless P=PPAD
(Section 4).
At this point, we have shown that financial networks with CDSs are indeed “more
complex” than those without. However, we should also be able to explain where
this newfound complexity comes from. This is important to be able to inform future
decisions on regulatory policy beyond an overly simple statement like “CDSs are
problematic.”
In our quest for an “origin” of the computational complexity, we proceed in two
steps. In a first step, we ask what aspect of a solution to the clearing problem is hard
to compute. We show that hardness in the decision and search problems does not
arise exclusively from the need to compute precise numerical values for the recovery
rates. Instead, it is already NP-hard to decide if some given bank will default in some
ε-solution (an appropriate distinction variant is NP-complete) and in the case without
default costs, it is already PPAD-complete to find a set of banks that will default in
some ε-solution (Section 5).
In a second step, we study restrictions on the network structure to discern what
economic aspects of financial networks the computational complexity might originate
from. It follows from our reductions that the problems are still hard in a model where
counterparty risk (i.e., the dependence of a bank on its debtors) is neglected. Thus,
we can say that the complexity originates from fundamental risk (i.e., the dependence
of CDS counterparties on the reference entity). Finally, we obtain an upper bound on
complexity. We show that hardness hinges on the presence of naked CDSs, i.e., CDSs
that are held without also holding a corresponding debt contract.6 If naked CDSs are
6Naked CDSs are a common phenomenon in practice. While we are not aware of any empirical
studies that quantify the share of CDSs that are naked, there seems to be a broad consensus that
they form the majority of CDS positions. Kiff et al. (2009) noted that the (gross) notional of CDSs
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not allowed, a solution always exists and we show that a simple iterative algorithm
first presented in Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019) constitutes a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS; Section 6). These insights will allow
us to frame a rather complete picture regarding the “origin of the complexity” and
they have various implications for regulatory policy (Section 7).
Attempts to capture the “complexity” of the financial network have, of course, been
made before. We differentiate between informal complexity due to i) the structure
of interconnections and ii) the nature of the contracts themselves. Complexity due
to the network structure has previously been approached using various measures
from graph theory, such as the length of a path between ultimate borrowers and
lenders (Shin, 2010), average degree (Gai, Haldane and Kapadia, 2011), network
concentration (Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May, 2012), network entropy (Battiston
et al., 2016), or spectral measures (Bardoscia et al., 2017). As these measures require
ordinary graphs as their inputs, where edges cannot contain more information than
weights, they need to abstract over details of the contracts, such as the dependence of
a financial derivative on its underlying market variable. Sensitivity results (Hemenway
and Khanna, 2016; Liu and Staum, 2010; Feinstein et al., 2017) are another way to
capture “complexity due to interconnectedness” and are also related to computational
complexity. These results have so far only been obtained for networks of debt or
cross-holdership. Basel III regulations measure a bank’s “interconnectedness” by the
size of its intra-financial assets, while its “complexity” (of individual contracts) is
measured by its amount of OTC7 derivatives, among others (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2014).
The second kind of complexity, due to the nature of individual contracts, has
begun to receive attention from theoretical computer science. Arora et al. (2011) and
Zuckerman (2011) studied the cost of asymmetric information in financial derivatives
markets with computationally bounded agents. Braverman and Pasricha (2014)
showed that compound options8 are computationally hard to price correctly. These
pieces of work study types of contracts that are “complex” even in isolation. In
contrast, a single CDS is a very simple contract.9 Hence, we show in this paper that
otherwise simple derivatives, if they occur as part of an otherwise simple network
“continues to far exceed the stock of corporate bonds and loans on which most contracts are written.”
Crotty (2009) quotes Eric Dinallo, then Superintendent of Insurance for New York State, saying that
80 percent of the CDSs outstanding are speculative (i.e., naked). Regulatory changes after 2009,
like central clearing and portfolio compression (see Section 7), may have reduced the share of naked
CDSs, but they cannot eliminate it below a significant level.
7Over-the-counter, i.e., traded directly with other banks rather than through an exchange. In this
paper we only consider OTC derivatives.
8An option is a derivative that grants the holder the right to buy (call option) or sell (put option)
an asset A at a specified time in the future for a previously agreed-upon price K. A compound
option is an option where A is itself an option.
9Valuation of a CDS is straightforward if distributions of recovery rates are known for the reference
entity and counterparty. See Duffie (1999).
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structure, create a financial system of high (computational) complexity.
The only other computational complexity result for financial networks we are
aware of is by Hemenway and Khanna (2016), who studied the clearing model by
Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014). The authors showed that it is computationally
hard to determine the distribution of a given total negative shock to the banks that
does the worst damage in terms of value. In contrast, we prove in this work that in
financial networks with CDSs, it is already hard to determine the impact of a known
distribution of shocks to banks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
present a computational hardness result for the clearing problem.
Techniques Used
Since the clearing problem refers to an explicit network, it is natural for us to employ
reduction from circuit problems to prove our hardness results.
To prove that deciding existence of a solution is NP-hard, we perform reduction
from the Circuit Satisfiability problem. We encode Boolean circuits in a way
reminiscent of electrical circuits. Boolean values are represented by recovery rates
that are bounded away from 1/2 by a constant and we define two financial system
gadgets: one that allows a bank to have either a low or a high recovery rate, for
the inputs, and one that implements a NAND operation, for the gates. We prevent
accumulation of errors via a special reset gadget that maps low values to 0± ε high
values to 1± ε. Finally, we add a financial sub-network that has no solution iff the
recovery rate of the “output bank” of the circuit is low.
We frame the decision problem as a promise problem: algorithms are only re-
quired to show any useful behavior on “clear-cut” instances where either an exact
solution exists or not even an ε-approximate solution exists, for some small ε. For
intermediate instances (only an approximate solution exists), any behavior including
non-termination is acceptable. Promise problems are useful for problems where
solutions may not be of polynomial length. For example, Schoenebeck and Vadhan
(2012) used this approach in the context of certain classes of Nash equilibria. See
Goldreich (2005) for a further discussion.
We show PPAD-hardness of the search problem via reduction from generalized
circuits. Originally developed for the analysis of the complexity of finding a Nash
equilibrium (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009; Chen, Deng and Teng,
2009; Rubinstein, 2018), generalized circuits have found application in the study of
other total search problems. A generalized circuit consists of arithmetic gates and
comparison gates,10 and it can have cycles. The associated search problem asks for
a vector of values that is approximately consistent with each gate. Our reduction
10Traditionally, generalized circuits have also supported Boolean gates that operate on approximate
Boolean values similar to above. Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) recently showed that the Boolean
gates are in fact redundant and can therefore be omitted.
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is straightforward: for each type of gate, we define a gadget that (approximately)
performs the respective operation on the recovery rates. PPAD-hardness then follows
from hardness of generalized circuits for constant ε (Rubinstein, 2018). Hardness for
constant ε is the strongest kind of hardness result one can obtain here and precludes
existence of a PTAS unless P=PPAD. If ε shrinks polynomially as the input grows, this
only precludes an FPTAS. If it shrinks exponentially, it only precludes membership
in P.
To show that already finding a set of defaulting banks is PPAD-hard, we define a
new discrete variant of the generalized circuit problem, which may be of independent
interest. In this problem, we only ask for one of three states for each gate: high,
medium, or low. These states correspond to “decision” or “truncation points” in the
definition of the gates. For example, the addition gate is in a high state if and only if
its inputs sum to more than one and its output is therefore truncated at one. States
also allow for ε errors. It is PPAD-complete to find a collection of states consistent
with some ε-solution of the circuit because with states fixed, the constraints on the
gates are linear and one can reconstruct an ε-solution via linear programming. We
then show that in our above reduction from financial networks to generalized circuits,
the set of defaulting banks already determines the states of the gates. We hope that
our technique may be useful to prove hardness of discrete versions of other search
problems in the future.
Basic Notation
Throughout this paper, we say that ε is sufficiently small (in formulas: ε 1) if it
is below a certain positive threshold, where the exact value of the threshold is not
relevant in the following. The threshold may depend on parameters that are arbitrary,
but fixed, but it will never depend on the input to any computational problem and
should therefore treated as a constant. We sometimes write ε β to indicate that
the threshold is a monotonic (not necessarily linear) function of a term β. We write
Θ(ε) for cε where c > 0 is a certain constant that is not relevant in the following and
does not depend on any values or parameters. We define [x] := min (1, max (0, x)),
the truncation of x to the interval [0, 1]. We write x = y ± ε for |x− y| ≤ ε if x and
y are scalars and for ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ ε if they are vectors. We also use the notation
“±ε” in compound expression like [x± ε] to indicate a range of values. This notation
formally corresponds to interval arithmetic.
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2 Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps11
Throughout this paper, we use our clearing model from Schuldenzucker, Seuken and
Battiston (2019). We now present the details of this model and provide a high-level
discussion of the effects of CDSs. We then present a new relaxation of our solution
concept, which is necessary to be able to receive an (approximate) solution of finite,
polynomial length.
2.1 The Model
Financial System. Let N denote a finite set of banks. Each bank i ∈ N holds a
certain amount of external assets, denoted by ei ≥ 0. Between any two banks i and
j, |N |+ 1 numbers capture the contracts from the contract writer i to the holder j.
Let c∅i,j ≥ 0 be the total amount of debt that i owes to j and for k ∈ N let cki,j ≥ 0
be the total amount of CDSs from i to j with reference entity k. We also call the
numbers cki,j (k ∈ N ∪ {∅}) the notionals of the respective contracts. If cki,j > 0 for
some k ∈ N ∪ {∅}, we call j a creditor of i and j a debtor of i.
We make two sanity assumptions to rule out pathological cases. First, no bank
may enter into a contract with itself or on itself (i.e., c∅i,i = c
j
i,i = c
j
i,j = cii,j = 0 for
all i, j ∈ N). Second, as CDSs are defined as insurance on debt, we require that any
bank that is a reference entity in a CDS must also be writer of some debt contract
(i.e., if ∑k,l∈N cik,l > 0, then ∑j∈N c∅i,j > 0, for all i ∈ N).12
We model default costs following Rogers and Veraart (2013): there are two default
cost parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Defaulting banks are only able to pay to their creditors
a share of α of their external assets and a share of β of their incoming payments.
Thus, α = β = 1 means that there are no default costs and α = β = 0 means that
assets held by defaulting banks are worthless. The values 1 − α and 1 − β are the
default costs.
A financial system is a tuple (N, e, c, α, β) where N is a set of banks, e is a vector
of external assets, c is a 3-dimensional matrix of contracts, and α and β are default
cost parameters. Note that, even though α and β are part of the definition of a
financial system, our results in this paper will be for restrictions of the respective
problems to arbitrary but fixed values of α and β. The parameters can therefore be
considered constant.
Note that we neither specify a distribution of shocks nor an initial payment when a
contract is made. We assume that these values are implicitly reflected in the external
11An extended version of subsections 2.1, 2.2, and parts of Effects of Allowing CDSs of this section
has previously appeared in our prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019, Section 2).
We repeat a short version here for convenience. See the aforementioned paper for a discussion of
alternative models for financial networks with CDSs.
12For technical reasons, we allow our financial system gadgets in section 3 and 4 to violate the
second assumption. In this case, the violating banks will be “dummy banks” that hold and write no
contracts and are ignored when considering solutions.
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assets.
Assets and Liabilities. We are ultimately looking for a vector of recovery rates
ri ∈ [0, 1]. For any two banks banks i and j, the contracts from i to j give rise to a
liability of i to j. This is the amount of money that i has to pay to j. A debt contract
gives rise to an unconditional liability equal to its notional, but the liability in a CDS
on some bank k depends on the recovery rate of k and is proportional to 1− rk. The
total liability from i to j at r is therefore:
li,j(r) := c∅i,j +
∑
k∈N
(1− rk) · cki,j
The total liabilities of i at r are the aggregate liabilities that i has toward all other
banks, denoted by
li(r) :=
∑
j∈N
li,j(r).
The actual payment pi,j(r) from i to j at r can be lower than li,j(r) if i is in
default. A bank that is in default makes payments for its contracts in proportion to
the respective liability;
pi,j(r) := ri · li,j(r).
The total assets ai(r) of a bank i at r consist of its external assets ei and the incoming
payments;
ai(r) := ei +
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
In case bank i is in default, its assets after default costs a′i(r) are the assets reduced
according to the factors α and β. This is the amount that will be paid out to creditors;
a′i(r) := αei + β
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
Remark 1. To see that CDSs indeed act as insurance on default, let i, j, k ∈ N and
assume that bank j holds both debt from k and a CDS on k, both with the same
notional: cki,j = c∅k,j =: δ > 0. Then the assets of j contain the term rk ·δ+ri ·(1−rk)·δ.
As long as ri = 1, this term is equal to δ independently of rk.
Clearing Recovery Rate Vector. Following Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we call
a recovery rate vector r ∈ [0, 1]N clearing if it satisfies the essential principles of
bankruptcy law:
1. Banks with sufficient assets to pay their liabilities in full must do so.
2. Banks with insufficient assets to pay their liabilities in full are in default and
must pay out all their assets to creditors after default costs have been subtracted.
This leads to the following formal definition:
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Figure 1 Example financial system. Let α = β = 0.5
A
B C1
2
1
0
2 1
Definition 1 (Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a financial
system. Define the update function
F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N
Fi(r) :=
1 if ai(r) ≥ li(r)a′i(r)
li(r) if ai(r) < li(r).
A recovery rate vector r ∈ [0, 1]N is called clearing for X if it is a fixed point of the
update function, i.e., if Fi(r) = ri for all i. We also call a clearing recovery rate vector
a solution to the clearing problem.
2.2 Example and Visual Representation
Figure 1 shows a visual representation of an example financial system. There are
three banks N = {A,B,C}, drawn as circles, with external assets of eA = 0, eB = 2,
and eC = 1, drawn as rectangles on top of the banks. Debt contracts are drawn as
blue arrows from the writer to the holder and they are annotated with the notionals
c∅B,A = 2 and c∅B,C = 1. CDSs are drawn as orange arrows, where a dashed line
connects to the reference entity, and are also annotated with the notionals: cBA,C = 1.
Default cost parameters α = β = 0.5 are given in addition to the picture.
A clearing recovery rate vector for this example is given by rA = 1, rB = 13 ,
and rC = 1. The liabilities arising from this recovery rate vector are lB,A(r) = 2,
lB,C(r) = 1, and lA,C(r) = 23 . Payments are pB,A(r) =
2
3 , pB,C =
1
3 , and pA,C(r) =
2
3 .
This is the only solution for this system.
2.3 Effects of Allowing CDSs
The addition of CDSs significantly changes the mathematical properties of the model.
Most importantly, the assets of a bank i can now contain terms of form ckj,i ·rj · (1−rk)
and are thus non-linear and non-monotonic in the recovery rates of the other banks,
and so is the update function F . In contrast, if only debt contracts are allowed, the
assets are always linear and monotonic and F is piecewise linear and monotonic, where
11
the linear segments are given by regions where the set of defaulting banks does not
change. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) exploited this for their fictitious default algorithm:
we keep track of a candidate set of defaulting banks, beginning with the empty set.
In each step, we solve a linear equation system to compute clearing recovery rates
assuming this set of banks defaults. We then update the set of defaulting banks. By
monotonicity, this set can only grow over time and we terminate at a solution after at
most |N | steps. In particular, a rational solution of polynomial length always exists.
If there are default costs, a discontinuity appears at the boundary of the default
regions, but, as Rogers and Veraart (2013) have shown, the algorithm still works.
The fictitious default algorithm clearly does not extend to CDSs. First, since
the update function is now not necessarily linear (and also not convex or concave),
the individual steps cannot easily be performed in polynomial time. Further, by
non-monotonicity, the set of defaulting banks need not grow monotonically over time
and thus the algorithm would not necessarily terminate. Indeed, we show in Section 5
that already finding the correct set of defaulting banks is hard.
In Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019) we showed that the combination
of non-monotonicity and the discontinuity introduced by default costs can create a
situation where no solution to the clearing problem exists. The idea of our counterex-
ample was that if a bank holds a CDS on itself, then this can lead to a situation where
default of this bank implies non-default and vice versa. In a network, an equivalent
situation can arise indirectly. The discontinuity ensures that a “middle ground” is not
attainable. We present a generalized construction for this kind of system in Section 3
below.
We have considered two important special cases in our above prior work. First,
if there are no default costs (α = β = 1), continuity is restored13 and one can show
using a fixed-point theorem that a solution always exists. In Section 4 of this paper
we show, however, that finding (an approximation of) this solution is hard. The
second special case is when naked CDSs are not allowed and where monotonicity is
restored. In this case, we have received a constructive proof of existence and we will
show in Section 6.2 that it in fact constitutes an FPTAS.
2.4 Approximate Solutions
Due to the non-linearity discussed above, there are financial systems where all
solutions contain irrational numbers (see Appendix A for an example). To receive
finite, polynomial-length objects, we relax Definition 1 to an approximate solution as
follows.
Definition 2 (Approximately Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β)
be a financial system and let ε ≥ 0. A recovery rate vector r is called ε-approximately
13The function F can still contain a discontinuity at the boundaries of the sets {r | li(r) = 0}. This
is easy to circumvent, though.
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clearing (or an ε-solution) for X if for each i ∈ N at least one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
ri = 1± ε and ai(r) ≥ (1− ε)li(r)
ri =
a′i(r)
li(r)
± ε and ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r)
Note how both the “case selection part” and the “output part” of the definition
of the function F are relaxed. Banks with much higher assets than liabilities are
unambiguously not in default and those with much lower assets than liabilities are in
default. But when assets approximately equal liabilities, a bank can be considered
either of the two. Default in the real world is not a knife-edge decision, but has
some tolerance. Therefore, the above definition likely reflects what (say) a regulator
running a stress test will be interested in. Recall that the precision ε is defined in
the space of recovery rates. That is why ε is used as an additive error in the output
recovery rate, but a multiplicative one when comparing assets and liabilities.
We take the following elementary properties as evidence that our approximate
solution concept is natural. The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Proposition 1. Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a financial system.
1. An exact solution is the same as a 0-solution. If ε′ > ε ≥ 0, then any ε-solution
is also an ε′-solution.
2. If F (r) = r ± ε, then r is an ε-solution.
3. If α = β = 1, then F (r) = r ± ε if and only if r is an ε-solution.
4. If r is an ε-solution, then we have:
ai(r) ≥ (1 + ε)li(r)⇒ ri = 1± ε
ai(r) < (1− ε)li(r)⇒ ri = a
′
i(r)
li(r)
± ε
5. If r is an ε-solution and li(r) > 0, then ri ≤ ai(r)li(r) + ε.
6. If r is an ε-solution and ri < 1 − ε, then ri ≤ max(α, β) + ε. If in addition
ei = 0, then ri ≤ β + ε.
Throughout this paper, we will make the following additional technical assumption.
Definition 3 (Non-degenerate Financial System). A financial systemX = (N, e, c, α, β)
is called non-degenerate if every bank that writes any contracts also writes a debt
contract. That is, for all i ∈ N , if ∑j,k∈N cki,j > 0, then ∑j∈N c∅i,j > 0.
Note that non-degeneracy is a very weak requirement in the real world. All we
demand is that every bank has some constant liabilities, for example to its customers.
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In non-degenerate financial systems, we can round any exact solution to receive an
ε-solution of polynomial length.
Lemma 1. Let ε > 0 and let X be a non-degenerate financial system. If X has an
exact solution, then X has an ε-solution of size polynomial in the sizes of ε and X.
Proof. Assume WLOG that every bank writes a debt contract. If this is not true for
some bank, no other bank depends on its recovery rate by non-degeneracy and our
sanity assumptions. We can thus simply set its recovery rate to 1.
Note that the functions aili and
a′i
li
are polynomially continuous inX, i.e., continuous
with a Lipschitz constant that is O
(
2poly(size(X))
)
. This is because ai, a′i, and li are
polynomially continuous and li is bounded above
∑
j c
∅
i,j > 0 because every bank
writes a debt contract. In particular, ai(r)li(r) and
a′i(r)
li(r) is well-defined for all r. Let M
be the maximum of the Lipschitz constants of these functions and 1.
Let r be an exact solution and let r′ be r rounded to a multiple of δ := ε/(M + 1),
so that r′ = r ± δ. By polynomial continuity, r′ has a size as required. To see that r′
is an ε-solution, we perform a case distinction for each i:
• If ri = 1, then r′ satisfies the first case in Definition 2. We have r′i = ri±δ = 1±ε.
Further, since ri = 1 we have ai(r)li(r) ≥ 1, by choice of M and r′,
ai(r′)
li(r′) =
ai(r)
li(r) ±Mδ ≥ 1− ε, and thus ai(r′) ≥ (1− ε)li(r′).
• If ri < 1, then r′ satisfies the second case. We have r′i = ri ± δ = a
′
i(r)
li(r) ± δ =
a′i(r′)
li(r′) ± (M + 1)δ =
a′i(r′)
li(r′) ± ε. Since ri < 1,we have
ai(r)
li(r) < 1 and thus
ai(r′)
li(r′) =
ai(r)
li(r) ± ε < 1 + ε, that is, ai(r′) < (1 + ε)li(r′).
The proof of the previous lemma made use of the fact that we relaxed both sides
of the definition of F in our definition of an ε-solution. Note that, since F is not
usually continuous, we do not necessarily receive an approximate fixed point of F via
rounding. Note further that the lemma does not imply that all ε-solutions are close
to an exact solution (if one exists) or have polynomial length. This is common for
approximate solution concepts.14
14Using a theorem by Anderson (1986), it follows from the syntactic structure of the definition
that for any X and δ there is an ε such that any ε-solution for X is δ-close to an r that is
almost an exact solution: ri = Fi(r) unless ai(r) = li(r), in which case we can have ri = 1 or
ri = a′i(r)/li(r) = a′i(r)/ai(r). However, ε depends on X in this case, while we consider a constant ε
in this paper. It is easy to construct examples where for constant ε, exact and approximate solutions
are far apart. Etessami and Yannakakis (2010) studied search problems for strong approximate fixed
points, which need to be close to an exact fixed point. Computational complexity is markedly higher
than for the regular approximate variants. For example, it is an open question if finding a strong
approximate Nash equilibrium is even in NP.
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3 The Complexity of Deciding Existence of a Solution
The goal of this section is to prove our first main result: It is hard to distinguish
between financial systems that have an exact solution and those that have no ε-
solution.
Theorem 1. For any fixed α and β such that α < 1 or β < 1 and for ε sufficiently
small depending on α and β, the promise problem ε-HasClearingα,β, defined as
follows, is NP-complete: Given a non-degenerate financial system X = (N, e, c, α, β),
. . .
• if X has an exact solution, return Yes.
• if X has no ε-solution, return No.
If none of the two conditions is satisfied, any behavior including non-termination
is allowed. Membership in NP follows from Lemma 1 because it is enough to decide
if an ε-solution of a certain polynomial maximum length exists. One might argue
that it would be more natural to instead consider the problem “Given X, return Yes
if an ε-solution exists and No otherwise.” Theorem 1 implies that this problem is
NP-hard for 0 ≤ ε  1, but it does not imply that it is a member of NP. This is
because Lemma 1 does not imply that there is always an ε-solution of polynomial
length if an ε-solution exists, but only when an exact solution exists.15 Note further
that ε-HasClearingα,β becomes (weakly) easier as we increase ε, while this is not
clear for the above non-promise variant. Framing the problem as a promise problem
avoids these issues.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to showing hardness of the
ε-HasClearingα,β problem. Our reduction is from Circuit Satisfiability. We
will represent Boolean values by recovery rates that are contain in the set [0, 1/4] ∪˙
[3/4, 1], with the low part of this set representing False and the high part representing
True. We then encode the inputs and the gates using financial system gadgets and we
force the output to True by adding another special financial sub-system. We prevent
error accumulation using a special reset gadget not unlike the brittle comparison
gadget in Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009).
3.1 Financial System Gadgets
We first introduce some technical machinery for the proofs in this section and Section 4.
We define a financial system gadget as a small financial system where the recovery
rate of an output bank depends on a collection of input banks in a certain way. We can
15The proof of the lemma implies that an ε-solution of length polynomial in the length of ε− ε0
exists if an ε0-solution exists, for some 0 ≤ ε0 < ε. To derive membership in NP for the non-promise
problem, we would need to bound inf {ε0 | an ε0-solution exists} from above relative to the length of
X. We leave it to future work to explore to which extent this might be possible.
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“plug” a gadget into another financial system by simply identifying its input banks
with some other banks. We will use this to successively build up financial systems.
Definition 4 (Financial System Extension and Gadget). An extension of a financial
system X = (N, e, c, α, β) is a financial system X ′ = (N ′, e′, c′, α, β) such that N ⊆ N ′
and the assets and liabilities of each bank i ∈ N are the same in X and X ′. That
is, we have e′i = ei ∀i ∈ N and if c′ki,j > 0, then either i) i, j /∈ N or ii) i, j ∈ N ,
k ∈ N ∪{∅}, and c′ki,j = cki,j . We call X ′ an extension of X on N0 ⊆ N if this holds for
all i, j ∈ N0. We call r ∈ [0, 1]N an ε-solution on N0 if the condition from Definition 2
holds for all i ∈ N0.
A financial system gadget is a financial system G = (N, e, c, α, β) with a set of
distinguished input banks A := {a1, ... , am} ⊆ N that have no assets or liabilities
(i.e., eai = ckai,j = c
k
j,ai
= 0 for i = 1, ... ,m, j ∈ N , and k ∈ N ∪ {∅}) such that the
following property holds: for any rA ∈ [0, 1]A there exists an rN\A ∈ [0, 1]N\A such
that rA ∪ rN\A is an exact solution on N \A. We say that G implements a property
P : [0, 1]N → {True,False} if for any sufficiently small ε and any ε-solution r of G
on N \A, P (r) holds. If X is a financial system and a′1, ... , a′m are banks in X each of
which writes a debt contract, then the application of G to X and a′1, ... , a′m is a new
financial system X ′ obtained as the union of X and G where we identify ai and a′i
for i = 1, ... ,m. Note that X ′ is an extension of X and an extension of G on N \A.
Remark 2 (Applying Several Gadgets). Gadgets are compatible with modifications of
the financial system and in particular with each other. To see this, first note that
if X ′ is an extension of X on N0 and r′ is an ε-solution for X ′, then the restriction
r′|N is an ε-solution for X on N0. Assume now that a gadget G = (N, e, c, α, β) with
inputs A implements a property P and X ′′ is an extension of G on N \A. X ′′ could
result, for example, from applying G to some financial system and then applying
arbitrary other gadgets on top. Let ε 1 and let r be an ε-solution for X ′′. Then,
by the extension, r|N is an ε-solution for G on N \A and thus, P (r|N ) holds.
Our financial system gadgets will have between zero and two input banks, which
we will call a and b for convenience. They will also have an output bank, called v,
and they will implement properties that make the recovery rate of the output bank
equal to a certain function of the recovery rates of the input banks, up to errors. We
will assume that each gadget contains a source bank s that holds no contracts and a
sink bank t that writes no contracts. The other banks hold CDSs from s and write
a debt contract of notional 1 to t, so that li(r) = 1. The connection to the inputs
is established via CDS references. We set c∅s,t = 1 to ensure non-degeneracy and we
further always set es ≥ 2∑i∈N, k∈N∪{∅} cks,i. This implies that s cannot default and
thus rs, rt = 1± ε in any ε-solution. For the sake of conciseness, we will leave out
these contracts and external assets in our descriptions of the gadgets. We mark the
input banks by dashed outlines in our figures.
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Figure 2 Zero-One Gadget. Variant of Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019,
Figure 3).
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3.2 Reducing Boolean Circuits to Finacial Systems
We begin with a financial system gadget where the output bank can have recovery
rates approximately 0 or 1. We will use this to encode variables.
Lemma 2 (Zero-One Gadget). For all α, β ∈ [0, 1] there is a financial system gadget
with no input banks such that the following hold:
• There exists an exact solution where rv = 0 and one where rv = 1.
• The gadget implements the following property: rv = 0±Θ(ε) or rv = 1±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider the financial system in Figure 2. We distinguish the cases β < 1 and
β = 1.
If β < 1, let δ = 2 11−β . It is easy to see that (ru, rv) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} are exact
solutions. We show that in any ε-solution r we have rv = 1± ε or rv = 0± 2ε. To see
this, let rv < 1− ε. Then rv ≤ β + ε by Proposition 1 and thus au(r) = δrs(1− rv) ≥
δ(1− ε)(1−β− ε) = 2(1− ε)(1− ε1−β ) ≥ 1 + ε = (1 + ε)lu(r) where the last inequality
holds for ε 1− β. Thus, ru = 1± ε and thus av(r) ≤ ε, so rv ≤ av(r)lv(r) + ε = 2ε.
If β = 1, let δ = 2. It is again easy to see that (ru, rv) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} are exact
solutions. Let r be an ε-solution. For i = u, v we have ai(r) = a′i(r) ∀r. This follows
from the definition of a′i because β = 1 and ei = 0. Like in Proposition 1 part 3, this
implies ri = Fi(r)± ε = [ai(r)]± ε. That is:
rv = [(1± ε)(1− ru)]± ε = 1− ru ± 2ε
ru = [2(1± ε)(1− rv)]± ε = [2(1− rv)]± 3ε
Taken together, these imply:
rv = 1− [2(1− rv)]± 5ε = [1− 2(1− rv)]± 5ε = [2rv − 1]± 5ε (∗)
We now perform a case distinction on rv.
• If rv ≥ 1/2, then [2rv − 1] = 2rv − 1 and thus by (∗), rv = 1± 5ε.
• If rv < 1/2, then [2rv − 1] = 0 and thus by (∗), rv = 0± 5ε.
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Figure 3 Cutoff Gadget
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We next work towards a NAND gadget to encode Boolean gates. We begin by
introducing a versatile tool that can be used to map values significantly above or
below certain thresholds to approximately 0 or 1. We will use this cutoff gadget in
this section and Section 4.
Lemma 3 (Cutoff Gadget). Let 0 < K < L < 1. There exists a financial system
gadget with one input bank that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ K −Θ (ε)⇒ rv = 0±Θ
(
ε
L−K
)
ra ≥ L+ Θ (ε)⇒ rv = 1±Θ
(
ε
L−K
)
.
Proof. Consider the gadget in Figure 316 where we set:
γ := 11−K
δ := 1−K
L−K
Consider an ε-solution. Let first ra ≤ K − 3ε. Then au(r) = γrs(1 − ra) ≥
γ(1− ε)(1−K + 3ε) = (1− ε)(1 + 3ε1−K ) ≥ (1− ε)(1 + 3ε) = 1 + 2ε− 3ε2 ≥ 1 + ε if
ε 1. Thus, ru = 1± ε. Now av(r) = δrs(1− ru) ≤ δε ≤ 2εL−K . And rv ≤ av(r)lv(r) + ε =
av(r) + ε ≤ av(r) + 3εL−K .
Let now ra ≥ L+ 4ε. Then au(r) ≤ γ(1− L− 4ε) = 1−L1−K − 4ε1−K and thus ru ≤
1−L
1−K − 4ε1−K +ε. Now av(r) ≥ δ(1−ε)
(
1− 1−L1−K + 4ε1−K − ε
)
= (1−ε)
(
1 + (3+K)εL−K
)
≥
(1− ε)(1 + 3ε) = 1 + 2ε− 3ε2 ≥ 1 + ε for ε 1. Thus, rv = 1± ε.
The cutoff gadget has two kinds of errors. First, there is always a region ra ∈
(K −Θ(ε), L+ Θ(ε)) ⊃ (K,L) where the output value is unspecified and depends
16Note that the gadget violates our sanity assumptions because the input banks is a CDS reference
entity, but not writers of any debt contracts. In this case, this does not cause any problems. Note in
particular that, as soon as the gadget is applied to some other system, the sanity assumption will
hold.
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Figure 4 NAND Gadget
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on error terms more than on the input. This is reminiscent of the brittle comparison
gate in generalized circuits (see Section 4). Second, there is an error in the output
that depends on how much “brittleness” we are willing to tolerate. We will show
in Section 4 how this trade-off can be circumvented. In this section, we use a large
brittleness to receive a gadget prevents error accumulation in the Boolean gadgets
below.
Corollary 1 (Reset Gadget). There exists a financial system gadget with one input
bank that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ 1/4⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ 3/4⇒ rv = 1±Θ (ε) .
Proof. Use a cutoff gadget with K = 2/5 and L = 3/5. For ε  1 we have
1/4 ≤ K −Θ(ε) and 3/4 ≥ L+ Θ(ε) and L−K = 1/5 is a constant.
To represent Boolean gates, we introduce a gadget that mirrors the Boolean
operation xNAND y = ¬(x ∧ y).
Lemma 4 (NAND Gadget). There exists a financial system gadget with two input
banks that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ 1/4 or rb ≤ 1/4 ⇒ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ 3/4 and rb ≥ 3/4 ⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
Proof. Apply the reset gadget each to a and b and call the output banks a′ and b′,
respectively. Then apply the gadget in Figure 4.
Assume first that ra ≤ 1/4 or rb ≤ 1/4. Then ra′ , rb′ = 0 ± Θ(ε) and thus
av(r) ≥ 2(1−ε)(1−Θ(ε)) ≥ 1+ε if ε 1. Thus, rv = 1±ε. Assume next that ra ≥ 3/4
and rb ≥ 3/4. Then ra′ , rb′ = 1±Θ(ε) and thus rv ≤ av(r)+ε ≤ 4Θ(ε)+ε = Θ(ε).
Using the previous lemma, we easily construct gadgets for all Boolean functions.
Note in particular that we can chain NAND gadgets without having to worry about
error accumulation because rv = 1±Θ(ε)⇒ rv ≥ 3/4 if ε 1, and likewise for 0. A
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chain of NAND gadgets will thus produce the appropriate output if the inputs to the
chain are in [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1]. This is why we use a reset gadget. We can combine a
collection of zero-one and NAND gadgets to represent a Boolean circuit.
Corollary 2 (Financial Boolean Circuit). Let C be a Boolean circuit with m inputs.
For χ ∈ {0, 1}m write C(χ) ∈ {0, 1} for the value of the output of C given values χ
at the inputs. For any α, β ∈ [0, 1] and ε sufficiently small there exists a financial
system X = (N, e, c, α, β) with m+ 1 distinguished banks V := {a1, ... , am, v} such
that the following hold:
1. For any assignment χ ∈ {0, 1}m there exists an exact solution r such that
rai = χi for i = 1, ... ,m.
2. If r is an ε-solution, then ri = 0±Θ(ε) or ri = 1±Θ(ε) for all i ∈ V .
3. If r is an ε-solution and i ∈ V , let χi = 0 if ri ≤ 1/4 and χi = 1 if ri ≥ 3/4.
Then χv = C(χa1 , ... , χam).
Proof. Assume WLOG that C consists only of NAND gates. We will identify the
nodes of C with certain banks in the to-be-constructed financial system. We begin
our construction with an empty financial system and build it up iteratively. First
apply the zero-one gadget (Lemma 2) m times and identify the output banks of these
gadgets with the input nodes of C. Now iterate over the gates of C in topological
order. For each NAND gate connecting two inputs to an output, by the topological
order, the inputs are already nodes in the financial system and the output is not.
Apply the NAND gadget (Lemma 4) to the inputs and identify the output bank with
the output node of the gate.
Property 1 is satisfied by the zero-one gadget, as is Property 2 for i = a1, ... , am.
Property 2 for i = v and property 3 follow by induction on the number of gates by
the NAND gadgets.
3.3 Reducing Satisfiability to Existence of a Solution
The final step in our construction is a way to “destroy” certain unwanted ε-solutions.
We will use this to remove exactly those solutions that correspond to falsifying
assignments of the Boolean circuit in our previous construction, leaving only those
corresponding to satisfying assignments, if any. Note that this cannot be done using
a financial system gadget because it does not preserve all existing solutions. The
approach is otherwise exactly the same, though.
Lemma 5. Let α, β be such that α < 1 or β < 1. There exists a financial system
G = (N, e, c, α, β) with a distinguished input bank a ∈ N with no assets or liabilities
such that the following hold:
1. For any rv ≥ 3/4, there exists an rN\{a} ∈ [0, 1]N\{a} such that ra ∪ rN\{a} is
an exact solution on N \ {a}.
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Figure 5 High-level structure of the financial system in Lemma 5, case β < 1. Gray
boxes indicate gadgets with their output banks. A dashed line with a hollow arrow
tip connects a bank to a gadget of which it is an input bank. The parameters of the
cutoff gadget are chosen such that β < K < β+12 < L < 1 evenly spaced.
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2. For ε 1, there is no ε-solution r on N \ {a} where ra ≤ 1/4.
Proof. We distinguish the cases β < 1 and α < β = 1.
If β < 1, perform the construction outlined in Figure 5: assume we have a source
and a sink bank as usual. Add a new bank B and let eB = 0 and c∅B,t = 1. Apply a
cutoff gadget to B with K = 3β+14 and L =
β+3
4 . Note that β < K <
β+1
2 < L < 1
evenly spaced and the output error of the cutoff gadget is Θ( εL−K ) = Θ(
ε
1−β ). Call
the output bank of the cutoff gadget u, apply an OR gadget to a and u and call the
output A. Finally, add CDS cAs,B = 2.
Towards property 1, if ra ≥ 3/4, then by the OR gadget (and this by the NAND
gadget), we can set rA = 1 independently of ru. We can then extend r to the other
banks via rB = 0 and by setting the recovery rates for the intermediate nodes of the
gadgets accordingly.
Towards property 2, if ra ≤ 1/4, assume towards a contradiction that r is an
ε-solution on N \ {a}. We perform case distinction on rB.
• If rB ≥ 1− ε, then in particular rB ≥ L+ Θ( ε1−β ) if ε 1− β.17 Thus, by the
cutoff gadget and the OR gadget, rA = 1±Θ(ε). But then rB ≤ aB(r) + ε ≤
2Θ(ε) + ε < 1− ε for ε 1. Contradiction.
• If rB < 1 − ε, then rB ≤ β + ε ≤ K − Θ( ε1−β ), where the first inequality is
by Proposition 1 and the second inequality holds for ε  1 − β. Therefore,
ru = 0 ± Θ(ε) and since rv ≤ 1/4 we have ra = 0 ± Θ(ε). This implies
17The threshold for ε is Θ((1 − β)2). The fact that this is nonlinear in 1 − β is not a problem.
Recall that we did not assume that ε = Θ(1− β) if ε 1− β.
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aB(r) ≥ 2(1 − ε)(1 − Θ(ε)) ≥ 1 + ε for ε  1. This implies rB ≥ 1 − ε.
Contradiction.
If α < β = 1, let eB = cAs,B = 4/5 and K = 3α+14 and L =
α+3
4 , and keep everything
else the same as above. Note that α < K < α+12 < L < 1 evenly spaced and the
output error of the cutoff gadget is Θ( ε1−α). It is clear that property 1 follows just
like above. We show that property 2 follows in a similar way to above. Assume that
ra ≤ 1/4.
• If rB ≥ 1− ε, then this implies rB ≥ L+ Θ(ε) for ε 1− α, so rA = 1±Θ(ε)
and thus rB ≤ aB(r) + ε ≤ 4/5 + 4/5 ·Θ(ε) + ε < 1− ε for ε 1. Contradiction.
• If rB < 1− ε, we must have aB(r) < 1 + ε and rB = a′B(r)± ε ≤ aB(r)− (1−
α)eB + ε < 1− (1− α)eB + 2ε. The middle inequality is by definition of a′B in
case β = 1. We further receive
1− (1− α)eB + 2ε = 1− 45(1− α) + 2ε
= 3α+ 14 −
1
20(1− α)− 2ε
= K − 120(1− α)− 2ε ≤ K −Θ
(
ε
1− α
)
where the last line holds for ε  1 − α. This implies rA = 0 ± Θ(ε) and
aB(r) ≥ 4/5+4/5(1−ε)(1−Θ(ε)) ≥ 1+ε for ε 1 and this implies rB ≥ 1−ε.
Contradiction.
Theorem 1 now follows by application of the previous lemma to our financial
Boolean circuit.
Proof of Theorem 1, hardness. Reduction from Circuit Satisfiability. Given a
Boolean circuit C, apply Corollary 2 to construct the financial system X with output
bank v corresponding to C. Apply the system from Lemma 5 to X and v (where by
“application” we mean the same like for gadgets) to construct an extended system X ′.
Let ε 1 and solve ε-HasClearingα,β for X ′.
If C has a satisfiable assignment χ, this yields an exact solution for χ where
rv = 1 ≥ 3/4, so we can extend this to an exact solution of X ′. If C has no
satisfying assignment, then any solution to X satisfies rv = 0±Θ(ε) and therefore,
no ε-solution for X ′ exists. As these are the only two cases, any algorithm for
ε-HasClearingα,β must terminate on this instance and return Yes if C is satisfiable
and No otherwise.
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4 The Complexity of the Search Problem without Default
Costs
We will now focus on financial systems without default costs, i.e., where α = β = 1.
In these systems, we know that a solution always exists:
Theorem (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019, Theorem 2). Any financial
system (N, e, c, α = 1, β = 1) has an exact solution.
The proof of the above theorem is by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem and thus
not constructive. In this section, we study the associated search problem. Since it
may still be the case that all solutions are irrational (see Appendix A), we study the
associated approximation problem of computing an ε-solution.
Theorem 2. For ε  1, the total search problem ε-FindClearing, defined as
follows, is PPAD-complete: Given a non-degenerate financial system X = (N, e, c, α =
1, β = 1), compute an ε-solution.
The theorem immediately implies that no polynomial-time approximation scheme
(PTAS) exists, unless P=PPAD.
By Lemma 1, there is always an ε-solution of polynomial length. Recall from
Proposition 1 that for α = β = 1, an ε-solution is the same as an ε-approximate fixed
point of the update function, i.e., an r ∈ [0, 1]N such that F (r) = r ± ε. Note further
that, since α = β = 1 and we assume non-degeneracy, F simplifies to:
Fi(r) =
1 if c
k
i,j = 0 ∀j ∈ N, k ∈ N ∪ {∅}[
ai(r)
li(r)
]
otherwise.
Membership in PPAD now easily follows.
Proof of Theorem 2, membership. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. By
the above considerations, F is polynomially continuous. And finding a (Brouwer) fixed
point of a polynomially continuous function is in PPAD (Papadimitriou, 1994).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to showing PPAD-hardness via reduction
from generalized circuits.
4.1 Generalized Circuits
A generalized circuit (Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009) consists of nodes interconnected by
arithmetic or comparison gates. In contrast to regular arithmetic or Boolean circuits,
generalized circuits may contain cycles, which turns finding a consistent assignment
of node values into a non-trivial fixed point problem. Rubinstein (2018) introduced
a variant of generalized circuits that is well-suited for our purposes. To make our
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Figure 6 Conditions that should hold at a gate g for an ε-solution x of a generalized
circuit. Assume that the inputs of g are called a and b (if any) and the output is
called v. The gates Cζ ,C×ζ , and C>ζ take an additional parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1].
g = Cζ ⇒ x[v] = ζ ± ε
g = C+ ⇒ x[v] = [x[a] + x[a]]± ε
g = C− ⇒ x[v] = [x[a]− x[b]]± ε
g = C×ζ ⇒ x[v] = ζ · x[a]± ε
g = C>ζ ⇒ x[a] < ζ − ε ⇒ x[v] = 0± ε
x[a] > ζ + ε ⇒ x[v] = 1± ε
reduction to financial systems as simple as possible, we consider a reduced set of
gates, which does not change the computational properties (see Appendix B for a
detailed comparison).
Definition 5 (Generalized Circuit and Approximate Solution). A generalized circuit
is a collection of nodes and gates, where each node is labeled input of any number
of gates (including zero) and output of at most one gate. Inputs to the same gate
are distinguishable from each other. Each gate has one of the following types: Cζ
(constant, no inputs), C×ζ (scaling, one input), C+ or C− (addition and subtraction,
two inputs), or C>ζ (comparison to a constant, one input). For the gate types Cζ ,
C×ζ ,and C>ζ ,a numeric parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] is specified in addition to the input and
output nodes of the gate. The length of a generalized circuit is the number of bits
needed to describe the circuit, including the nodes, the mapping from nodes to inputs
and outputs of gates, and numeric parameters ζ involved.
For ε ≥ 0, an ε-solution of a generalized circuit is a mapping x that assigns to
each node v a value x[v] ∈ [0, 1] such that the constraints in Figure 6 hold at each
gate of type g with inputs a and b (if any) and output v.
We know from prior work that finding an ε-solution is hard:
Theorem (Essentially Rubinstein (2018)). For a (constant) sufficiently small ε, the
total search problem ε-GCircuit, defined as follows, is PPAD-complete: Given a
generalized circuit, find an ε-solution.
4.2 Reducing Generalized Circuits to Financial Systems
We now show how to encode a generalized circuit into a financial system via financial
system gadgets corresponding to the five gate types. Any ε-solution to the financial
system will give rise to a Θ(ε)-solution of the generalized circuit. Compared to
Section 3, our gadgets need to be more precise because we do not only have to map
between the appropriate parts of the set [0, 1/4] ∪˙ [3/4, 1] to each other, but we have
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Figure 7 Constant Gadget
s v t
ζ 10
Figure 8 Inverter Gadget
s v t1
a
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to encode arithmetic operations on continuous inputs in [0, 1]. The fact that we do
not have default costs in this section will help us achieve this higher precision. In our
gadgets, all banks except for the source and sink banks will have liabilities constant
1. We therefore have ri = Fi(r)± ε = [ai(r)]± ε in any ε-solution.
Our simplest gadget establishes a constant recovery rate at the output bank:
Lemma 6 (Constant Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there is a financial
system gadget with no input banks that implements the property rv = ζ ±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider Figure 7. Clearly, av(r) = ζ(1± ε) = ζ ± ε and rv = [av(r)]± ε =
ζ ± 2ε.
An important building block for the following constructions is a gadget that
“inverts” the recovery rate of a bank.
Lemma 7 (Inverter Gadget). If α = β = 1, there is a financial system gadget with
one input bank that implements the property rv = 1− ra ±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider Figure 8. Clearly, av(r) = (1 ± ε)(1 − ra) = 1 − ra ± ε and rv =
[av(r)]± ε = [1− ra]± 2ε = 1− ra ± 2ε.
Note that we could not have used the inverter gadget as a Boolean NOT gadget
in Section 3 because i) it relies on the assumption α = β = 1 and ii) it accumulates
errors, i.e., 2n inverters in a row yield ra ±Θ(nε), not ra ± ε. We proceed with the
addition and subtraction gadgets, which are slight variants of each other.
Lemma 8 (Sum Gadget). If α = β = 1, there is a financial system gadget with two
input banks that implements the property rv = [ra + rb]±Θ(ε).
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Figure 9 Sum Gadget. a¯ and b¯ are the outputs of inverters applied to a and b,
respectively.
s v t
1
a¯
1
b¯
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Proof. Apply inverter gadgets (Lemma 7) to both a and b and call the output banks
a¯ and b¯, respectively. Now apply the gadget in Figure 9. Then:
rv = [(1± ε)(1− ra¯) + (1± ε)(1− rb¯)]± ε = [ra + rb]± 3ε
Note the similarity of Figure 9 with Figure 4, which was used in the construction
of the NAND gadget in Section 3. Indeed. a similar operation is performed given that
aNAND b = ¬a∨¬b and addition is somewhat similar to Boolean “∨”. Note however
that these two constructions need to deal with different challenges: the NAND gadget
needs to work with default costs and the sum gadget needs to provide a correct sum
across all input values, not just approximate Boolean values.
Lemma 9 (Difference Gadget). There is a financial system gadget without default
costs with two input banks that implements the property rv = [ra − rb]±Θ(ε).
Proof. Apply an inverter gadget (Lemma 7) to a and call the output bank a¯. Apply
the gadget in Figure 9 to a¯ and b¯ := b and call the output bank u. From the proof of
the previous lemma we know that ru = [1− ra + rb]±Θ(ε). Now apply an inverter
to u and call the output bank v. It follows that
rv = 1− [1− ra + rb]±Θ (ε) = [ra − rb]±Θ (ε) ,
where the last equality follows by case distinction.
Our last two gadgets are scaling and comparison. Scaling is easily achieved by
noting that a chain of two inverters approximately copies the input. We then adjust
the notional in one of those gadgets. This happens to be a degenerate variant of the
cutoff gadget.
Lemma 10 (Scaling Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there exists a financial
system gadget that implements the property rv = ζra ±Θ(ε).
Proof. We use the financial system in Figure 3 from Section 3 with γ = 1 and δ = ζ.
We have ru = 1− ra ±Θ(ε) like in the inverter gadget and thus av(r) = ζ(1± ε)(1−
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(1−ra±Θ(ε))) = ζ(1±ε)(ra±Θ(ε)) = ζra±Θ(ε). And rv = [av(r)]±ε = ζra±Θ(ε).
Here we use ζ, ra ≤ 1 to bound the error.
For the comparison gate, the cutoff gadget (Lemma 3) almost does what we want.
However, the comparison gate makes demands to low brittleness (at the order of ε)
and low output error (also at the order of ε) that the cutoff gadget is not able to
achieve. Fortunately, we can use our previously introduced reset gadget (which itself
happens to be another incarnation of the cutoff gadget) to fix the output error.
Lemma 11 (Comparison Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there exists a
financial system gadget with one input bank that implements the following property:
ra ≤ ζ −Θ (ε)⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ ζ + Θ (ε)⇒ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
Proof. Let C > 0 be a constant such that C is an upper bound on the implicit
constant factors in the expressions Θ( εL−K ) on the right-hand sides of Lemma 3
(i.e., the output error; we can choose C = 3). Let c = 2C. Assume WLOG that
cε < ζ < 1− cε. If this is not the case, we can simply give v recovery rate constant 0
or 1. Apply now a cutoff gadget (Lemma 3) with K = ζ − cε and L = ζ + cε and call
the output gate u. Then apply a reset gadget (Corollary 1) to u and call the output
v.
By the cutoff gadget, if ra ≤ K − Θ(ε) = ζ − Θ(ε), then ru = 0 ± C εL−K =
0 ± C ε2cε = 0 ± 1/4. Thus, by the reset gadget, rv = 0 ± Θ(ε). Likewise for
ra ≥ ζ + Θ(ε).
With all gadgets in place, we can connect our gadgets to represent a generalized
circuit and prove PPAD-hardness.
Proof of Theorem 2, hardness. Reduction from Θ(ε)-GCircuit. Let C be a general-
ized circuit. We construct a financial system. For each node v of C, add a bank with
no assets or liabilities and identify that bank with v. For each gate g of C, execute
the corresponding gadget from this section with the appropriate input banks and
identify the output bank of the gadget with g. Finally, if a node v is the output of
gate g, take a copy of the scaling gadget with ζ = 1 (this is the same as two inverters
connected) and identify the input of the gadget with g and the output of the gadget
with v.18
18In the language of gadgets, this operation can be interpreted as applying the constructed financial
system, say X0, and the ×1-scaling gadget “to each other.” Note that in X0, v has no assets and
liabilities and can thus be considered an input bank. The result of the “application” will be an
extension of X0 at all banks but v and of the scaling gadget at all banks but its input. By Remark 2.,
this implies that all gadgets still behave as expected. In particular, we have rv = rg ±Θ(ε) in any
ε-solution.
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Now, by the gadgets, if ε  1 and r is an ε-solution for the financial system,
setting x[v] = rv for all nodes yields a Θ(ε)-solution of the generalized circuit. And
finding this is hard for ε 1.
5 The Complexity of Determining Defaults
Given the results in the previous two sections, one may wonder if we can somehow
pin down the “origin” of the computational complexity. What is it really that CDSs
do to a financial system that makes the decision and search problems so much harder
to solve? In this section and the next we explore this question.
To understand where the computational complexity comes from, we look for ways
to circumvent it. One way to do this might be to ask for less information than the
recovery rates themselves. If it is easy to find some bounds on the recovery rates,
for example, this could already be very useful. The minimum level of detail we will
likely be interested in is which banks default. We define a default set as a collection
of banks that (approximately) default in some (approximate) solution. A default set
thus provides a kind of “coarse representation” of a solution to the clearing problem.
Definition 6. Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a financial system and let ε ≥ 0. A set
D ⊆ N is called an ε-default set for X if there is an ε-solution r for X such that for
all i ∈ N :
i /∈ D ⇒ ai(r) ≥ (1− ε)li(r)
i ∈ D ⇒ ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r).
In this case, we call r and D ε-compatible.
We have relaxed the notion of being in default in the same way as in the definition
of an ε-solution. Again, this ensures that the problem will not be hard for the wrong
reasons, namely because of “knife-edge” defaults, where a small error in the assets or
liabilities could otherwise determine whether a bank defaults and thus lead to a large
error in the recovery rate. Banks at the edge of default can instead be considered
either of the two. A side effect of this liberty is that, say, i /∈ D does not generally
imply ri = 1± ε. It could also be that ai(r) ∈ [(1− ε)li(r), (1 + ε)li(r)) and ri = a
′
i(r)
li(r) .
That is, the decision about default in D and r need not coincide.
In the remainder of this section, we show that computational complexity does not
arise exclusively from the need to compute precise numeric values for the recovery
rates. Rather, computational problems are already hard at the level of default sets.
We study a decision and a search variant.
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5.1 Deciding the Default of a Given Bank
In the decision variant of our problem, we ask if there is a solution where a specified
bank defaults. This is a basic question a regulator might ask in a stress test: given a
certain shock scenario, will this make it necessary to save AIG again? If there are
multiple solutions and AIG only defaults in some of them, our answer should still be
“Yes,” i.e., we should consider the worst case.
We can consider this decision problem for any value of the default cost parameters.
If there are default costs, a naive framing of the problem would contain the question
if there is any solution in the first place. Since this is not what we are interested in at
this point, we exclude it by a promise. We then consider a distinction variant similar
to ε-HasClearingα,β (Theorem 1). The proof is rather straightforward using our
financial Boolean circuits from Section 3. The key technical step is to notice that
assets are either very small or very large compared to liabilities, so that defaults are
never ambiguous.
Theorem 3. For any fixed α, β ∈ [0, 1] and any ε 1, the following promise problem
is NP-complete: Given a non-degenerate financial system X = (N, e, c, α, β), and a
bank i ∈ N . . .
• if X has an exact solution and there is an exact default set D such that i ∈ D,
return Yes.
• if X has an exact solution and there is no ε-default set D such that i ∈ D,
return No.
Proof. Membership: By the proof of Lemma 1, if r is an exact solution and D exactly
compatible, we receive a polynomial-length ε-solution with which D is ε-compatible
with via rounding. Hence, it is enough to check all ε-solutions of a certain polynomial
maximum length. Note that if r is an ε-solution, then i ∈ D for some ε-compatible
default set D iff ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r).
Hardness: Reduction from Circuit Falsifiability. Given a Boolean circuit
C, consider the financial Boolean circuit system X from Corollary 2 and the output
node v =: i. Recall that v is the output of a NAND gadget (Lemma 4). If C
is falsifiable, let r be the exact solution corresponding to a falsifying assignment
and D its exactly compatible default set. By the proof of Lemma 4, we then have
av(r) = 0 < 1 = li(r) and thus v ∈ D. If C is not falsifiable, let ε 1, let r be any
ε-solution and D ε-compatible. By Corollary 2, the inputs to v’s NAND gadget are
approximately Boolean and not both True and again by the proof of the lemma, we
have av(r) ≥ 1 + ε, so v /∈ D.
The theorem immediately implies that the following problem is NP-hard: Given a
non-degenerate financial system with the promise that it has an exact solution and
a bank i, decide if i ∈ D for some ε-default set D. The problem may not be in NP
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because it is not guaranteed that every ε-solution has polynomial length. See the
discussion after Theorem 1. Note in particular that it is not clear how to check if a
given D ⊆ N is an ε-default set.
It is easy to see that the distinction problem is still NP-complete if we replace
“∈ D” by “/∈ D” (proof by negation of the circuit) and it is coNP-complete if we replace
“there exists D” by “for all D” (proof by reduction from Circuit Contradiction).
5.2 Finding Default Sets Without Default Costs
We return to the search problem without default costs. It is trivial to, given an
ε-solution, compute a default set compatible with it, while the converse is not so clear.
Thus, finding ε-default sets may a priori be easier than finding the ε-solution itself.
We will show that this is not the case.
Theorem 4. For ε  1, the following problem is PPAD-complete: Given a non-
degenerate financial system X = (N, e, c, α = 1, α = 1), compute an ε-default set.
In some domains, statements like this follow trivially hardness of the respective
continuous variant. For example, in a two-player normal-form game, the supports
of the strategies of the two players (i.e., the strategies that are played with nonzero
probability) could be taken as a “coarse representation” of a Nash equilibrium, similar
to default sets in our case. Finding the supports of a Nash equilibrium is trivially
PPAD-complete because a Nash equilibrium can be reconstructed from its supports
via linear programming, and finding Nash equilibria in two-player games is hard
(Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009).19 Given an ε-default set however, there does not seem
to be an easy way to reconstruct a corresponding ε-solution, given that already the
assets ai can contain terms like rj(1− rk), which are non-linear, non-convex/concave,
and non-monotonic. This remains true for the particular construction we perform
in Section 4. Here, the assets of the relevant banks contain terms of form rs(1− ra)
where s is the source bank and rs ∈ [1 − ε, 1]. It may be tempting to just assume
rs = 1 to make the problem linear. However, given a default set of an ε-solution
where (say) rs = 1 − ε, assuming rs = 1 implicitly introduces an error of ε into rs.
As the notionals in the system can be at the order of 1/ε,20 this may in turn imply a
large (constant in ε) change in the recovery rate of some other bank. No ε-solution
with such a recovery rate may exist.
Rather than reconstructing an ε-solution to the financial system from a default
set, we introduce a new discrete variant of the ε-GCircuit problem that is still
PPAD-complete and that may be of independent interest. We then show that any
ε-default set gives rise to a solution for the discrete Θ(ε)-GCircuit problem.
19ε must be polynomial, not constant, in the size of the game in this particular example.
20The comparison gadget (Lemma 11) introduces notionals of order 1/ε.
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Figure 10 Constraints that need to hold at each gate g when x is an ε-solution for a
generalized circuit compatible with an assignment d. Let a and b be the inputs (if
any) and v the output of g.
g = C+ ⇒ dg ∈ {L,M} ⇒ x[a] + x[b] ≤ 1 + ε ∧ x[v] = x[a] + x[b]± ε
dg = H ⇒ x[a] + x[b] ≥ 1− ε ∧ x[v] = 1± ε
g = C− ⇒ dg = L ⇒ x[a]− x[b] ≤ ε ∧ x[v] = 0± ε
dg ∈ {M,H} ⇒ x[a]− x[b] ≥ −ε ∧ x[v] = x[a]− x[b]± ε
g = C>ζ ⇒ dg = L ⇒ x[a] ≤ ζ + ε ∧ x[v] = 0± ε
dg = M ⇒ x[a] = ζ ± ε
dg = H ⇒ x[a] ≥ ζ − ε ∧ x[v] = 1± ε
5.3 The discrete ε-GCircuit problem
The main idea for our discrete version of ε-GCircuit is that the constraints for a
generalized circuit (Figure 6) are piecewise linear with a finite number of “cutoff”
or “decision points.” For example, the C+ gate corresponds to either a sum or a
constant depending on whether the sum of its inputs lies in [0, 1] or (1,∞). These
“decision points,” defined an appropriate way, allow us to reconstruct a solution by
solving a linear feasibility problem. Our approach is similar in spirit to Vazirani
and Yannakakis (2011), who split equilibrium computation in Fisher markets into
two steps: first, a PPAD-complete problem is solved to determine the combinatorial
structure of the equilibrium. Second, the exact numbers are computed in polynomial
time. We relax the definitions in a way that mirrors the definition of an ε-default
set, allowing ambiguity when we are close to the respective “decision point,” which
leaves us with three gate types.21 The Cζ and C×ζ gates have linear constraints and
therefore do not need any “decision” specified.
Definition 7. Let C be a generalized circuit and ε ≥ 0. A discrete ε-solution for C
assigns to each gate g of C a value dg ∈ {H,M,L} such that there exists an ε-solution
x for C such that the constraints in Figure 10 hold for each gate g with inputs a and
b and output v. In this case, we call x and d ε-compatible.
Note that our definition is monotonic in ε: if d is a discrete ε-solution and
ε′ > ε, then d is also a discrete ε′-solution. This is what we typically expect of an
approximate solution concept and we take it as an indication that our concept of a
discrete ε-solution is natural. We will exploit monotonicity in our proofs below.
Remark 3. If x is an ε-solution for C, we can define a discrete ε-solution dg as follows.
21This relaxation is crucial for our following reduction from ε-default sets. This is not just because
ε-default sets have this kind of relaxation, but due to ε errors in the solution itself. That is, even
if we required exact compatibility in the definition of an ε-default set, we would have to make this
relaxation here.
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• If g = C+, let dg = H if x[a] + x[b] ≥ 1 and dg = M otherwise.
• If g = C−, let dg = L if x[a]− x[b] ≤ 0 and dg = M otherwise.
• If g = C>ζ , let
dg =

L if x[a] < ζ − ε
M if x[a] = ζ ± ε
H if x[a] > ζ + ε.
The fact that x is an ε-solution will now ensure that the outputs match, too, and
thus d is a discrete ε-solution compatible with x.
Theorem 5. For a (constant) ε 1, the following total search problem, which we
call the discrete ε-GCircuit problem, is PPAD-complete: Given a generalized circuit,
find a discrete ε-solution.
Proof. Membership is obvious by reduction to the (continuous) ε-GCircuit problem.
For hardness, we perform reduction from the continuous problem. Let C be a
generalized circuit and let d be a discrete ε-solution for C. Consider the linear
feasibility problem (LFP) with a variable x[v] for each node v of C and the following
constraints:
1. For each v, add the constraint 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1.
2. For each gate g of type C+, C−, or C>ζ , add the constraint from Figure 6
corresponding to the value of dg.
3. For each gate g of type Cζ or C×ζ , add the constraint from Figure 6 corresponding
to the type of g.
Note that all constraints are linear. It is easy to verify that a vector x is feasible for
the LFP iff it is an ε-solution ε-compatible with d. By assumption, such an x exists
and we can find it in polynomial time via the LFP.
The proof of the theorem implies that a generalized circuit always has an exact
solution of polynomial length. This was previously noted by Etessami and Yannakakis
(2010) in their study of their FIXP complexity class. To see it from our proof, let d be
the default set of an exact solution (which exists by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem)
and solve the LFP for ε = 0.
5.4 ε-Default Sets Inform a Discrete Θ(ε)-Solution
We now re-examine the sum, difference, and comparison gadget from Section 4. We
show that the default states of some banks can be used to define a discrete Θ(ε)-
solution for the respective gate type that will be Θ(ε)-compatible with any ε-solution
of the gadget.
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Remark 4 (Bounding Recovery Rates via Default Sets). In contrast to the case with
default costs, if α = β = 1, we can bound the recovery rates based on the default set.
More in detail, if r is an ε-solution ε-compatible with D, then:
i /∈ D ⇒ ri = 1± 2ε
i ∈ D ⇒ ri = ai(r)
li(r)
± 2ε
This follows by case distinction using the equivalence between an ε-solution and an
ε-approximate fixed point of F .
If G is a gadget with input banks A and P : 2N × [0, 1]N → {True,False} is a
property, we say that G implements P on default sets if for ε 1, any ε-solution r
on N \A, and any D ⊆ N ε-compatible with r, P (D, r) holds.
For the sum gadget, we can simply consider the default state of the output bank.
Lemma 12 (Default Set of the Sum Gadget). If α = β = 1, then the sum gadget
(Lemma 8) implements the following property on default sets:
v /∈ D ⇒ ra + rb ≥ 1−Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
v ∈ D ⇒ ra + rb < 1 + Θ(ε) ∧ rv = ra + rb ±Θ(ε)
Proof. Recall that av(r) = ra + rb ±Θ(ε) and lv(r) = 1. The statement now follows
from Remark 4 and the fact that rv = [ra + rb]±Θ(ε).
For the difference gadget, the default state of the output bank is not informative.
To see this, recall that this bank is the output of an inverter gadget. In the inverter
gadget, though, the output bank is never unambiguously not in default because its
assets are at most 1 (see Figure 8). Thus, we could have v ∈ D independently of the
input or output recovery rates. To extract information from the default set, we need
to consider the input bank to the inverter gadget instead.
Lemma 13 (Default Set of the Difference Gadget). Let α = β = 1 and consider the
difference gadget (Lemma 9). Let u be the intermediate bank in that gadget. Then the
gadget implements the following property on default sets:
u /∈ D ⇒ ra − rb ≤ Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
u ∈ D ⇒ ra − rb > −Θ(ε) ∧ rv = ra − rb ±Θ(ε)
Proof. Recall that we have au(r) = 1− ra + rb ±Θ(ε) and rv = 1− ru ±Θ(ε). The
statement now follows just like in Lemma 12.
For the comparison gadget, we proceed in a similar way and consider the default
states in the first cutoff gadget (before the reset gadget). We need to consider the
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default states of both of the banks in this gadget to determine in which of the three
possible states the gadget is. Compared to the other two gadgets, we need to consider
the details of the construction in much greater detail.
Lemma 14 (Default Set of the Comparison Gadget). Let α = β = 1 and consider
the comparison gadget (Lemma 11). Let u1 and v1 be the intermediate banks that
correspond to the first cutoff gadget. Then the comparison gadget implements the
following property on default sets:
u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D ⇒ ra ≤ ζ + Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D ⇒ ra ≥ ζ −Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D ⇒ ra = ζ ±Θ(ε)
u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D is impossible.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Lemma 11 that the first cutoff gadget has parameters
K = ζ − cε and L = ζ + cε where c > 4 is a sufficiently large constant. Recall from
the definition of the cutoff gadget (Lemma 3) that this implies for the notionals in
Figure 3 that
γ = 11−K =
1
1− ζ + cε
δ = 1−K
L−K =
1− ζ + cε
2cε =
1− ζ
2cε +
1
2 .
Assume first that u1 /∈ D. By definition of an ε-default set and lu1(r) = 1, we have
1−ε ≤ au1(r) = γ(1−ra). Rearranging yields ra ≤ ζ−cε+ε(1−ζ+cε) ≤ ζ− (c−2)ε
if ε  c. We further must have ru1 ≥ 1 − 2ε, so rv1 ≤ av1(r) + ε ≤ δ · 2ε + ε =
(1 − ζ)/c + 2ε ≤ 1/4 for ε  1. This implies v1 ∈ D and, as v1 is input to a reset
gadget with output v, rv = 0±Θ(ε).
Assume next that u1 ∈ D. Then by Remark 4, ru1 = au1(r)± 2ε = γ(1− ra)±
(γ + 2)ε.
If now u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D, then
1− ε ≤ av1(r) ≤ δ(1− ru1)
≤ δ(1− (γ(1− ra)− (γ + 2)ε))
= δ − δγ + δγra + (δγ + 2δ)ε.
Rearranging yields: ra ≥ 1δγ − 1γ + 1−
(
1 + 2γ +
1
δγ
)
ε ≥ L− 4ε = ζ + (c− 4)ε, where
the middle inequality follows using the identities 1δγ = L −K and 1γ = 1 −K. Of
course, rv1 = 1± 2ε because v1 /∈ D and thus rv = 1± ε.
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If u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D, then
1 + ε ≥ av1(r) ≥ δ(1− ε)(1− ru1)
≥ δ(1− (γ(1− ra) + (γ + 2)ε)− δε
= δ − δγ + δγra − (δγ + 3δ)ε.
Rearranging like above yields: ra ≤ L + 5ε = ζ + (c + 5)ε. This bounds ra from
above. To bound ra from below, notice that, since u1 ∈ D, we have 1 + ε > au1(r) ≥
γ(1− ε)(1− ra). This implies ra ≥ 1− 1γ · 1+ε1−ε ≥ 1− 1γ (1 + 3ε) ≥ K−3ε ≥ ζ− (c−2)ε,
where the second inequality holds for ε 1.
Note that the implicit constants in the Θ(ε) expressions in the above lemma are
not the same. That is why the different cases in the previous lemma overlap.
Note that the proof of the previous lemma actually gives us slightly stronger
bounds on ra than stated. For example, in case u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D, we receive from the
proof that ra ≤ ζ − (c− 2)ε = ζ −Θ(ε), not just ra ≥ ζ + Θ(ε). Beyond uniformity
with the definition of a discrete ε-solution, the weaker version of the conditions has
the benefit of monotonicity: the conditions continue to hold if we increase ε. We will
exploit this in the following proof.
Using the above three lemmas, we can define a discrete ε-solution to a generalized
circuit given an ε-default set. This proves our theorem:
Proof of Theorem 4. Let C be a generalized circuit and let X be the financial system
without default costs corresponding to C like in the proof of Theorem 2. Let ε 1
and let D be an ε-default set of X. We show that for some ε′ = Θ(ε), D induces a
discrete ε′-solution d of C. This proves the theorem because finding the latter is hard
for ε′  1. We define d following the preceding lemmas. For each gate g of C, . . .
• If g = C+, consider the corresponding sum gadget and let dg = H if v ∈ D and
dg = M if v /∈ D.
• If g = C−,consider the corresponding difference gadget and let dg = L if u /∈ D
and dg = M if u ∈ D.
• If g = C>, consider the corresponding comparison gadget and let
dg =

L if u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D
H if u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D
M if u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D.
Let r be an ε-solution of X ε-compatible with D and let ε′ = Θ(ε) be the maximum
of all the incarnations of Θ(ε) in Lemma 12–14, in the proof of Theorem 2, and ε
itself. By the proof of Theorem 2, r induces an ε′-solution of C by restriction to the
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output banks of the gadgets corresponding to gates. Since the above lemmas still hold
if one replaces every instance of Θ(ε) by ε′ (due to monotonicity), they imply that
this induced ε′-solution of C is ε′-compatible with d. Thus, d is a discrete ε′-solution
of C.
In this section, we have shown that already finding an ε-default set of a financial
system with CDSs is hard. En-route, we have developed a general methodology to
show that “coarse” or “discrete” versions of PPAD-hard search problems are hard. We
believe that our methodology can be applied to other problems to receive this type
of result when the reduction is sufficiently faithful to the structure of a generalized
circuit. For example, Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) introduced
gadgets that encode a generalized circuit in a binary, degree-3 graphical game. It
is not hard to show that the supports of certain players in these gadgets inform a
discrete ε-solution of the generalized circuit. Thus, already finding the supports of an
ε-Nash equilibrium in such a game is hard.22 Unlike for two-player, n-action games,
this result is not trivial because graphical games can contain nonlinear interactions
and two-player games are not an immediate special case of graphical games. However,
in this particular instance, the result can be shown more directly. This is because
the game gadgets can easily be modified to ensure that players’ utilities are linear
combinations of other players’ strategies (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou,
2009, Section 6.1) and then an equilibrium can be reconstructed from the supports
using linear programming. Future work may well encounter other domains where,
like in financial networks with CDSs, no such modification is possible and where our
methodology can be of use.
6 Structural Restrictions
We continue our quest towards the “origin” of the computational complexity in
financial networks with CDSs. In this section, we study under which restrictions
on the network structure the distinction and search problems are still hard. This is
important, following our original program of study, to understand how the informal
“complexity” due to CDSs arises and to inform potential regulatory policies that
reduce it.
6.1 Counterparty Risk and Fundamental Risk
Inspection reveals that that our gadgets, and thus all hard instances constructed in
Section 3 and 4, share three properties that make them particularly simple financial
systems:
22Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) showed hardness when ε decreases with the size
of the game exponentially. Rubinstein (2018) extended their result to a constant ε using the same
gadgets. From this, we receive hardness of finding supports for constant ε as well.
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1. Acyclic Liabilities: The liability graph, where each writer of a contract is
connected to the respective holder, is acyclic. In fact, this graph is a disjoint
union of chains of form s→ i→ t, where s and t are the source and sink banks
and i is some other bank.
2. No Intermediation: No bank both holds and writes a CDS on the same reference
entity. The liability graphs for individual reference entities are therefore disjoint
unions of (in- or out-) star graphs.
3. No Counterparty Risk: For each contract, either the holder or the writer is
a highly capitalized bank, i.e., its external assets are significantly (by factor
2 ≥ 1 + ε, for any relevant ε) higher than its maximum liabilities and thus, they
cannot default. Further, only highly capitalized banks are writers of CDSs.
Property 1 and 2 are in stark contrast to much of the prior work on financial networks,
which has often only considered the liability graph, where either reference entities were
ignored altogether or they were treated as mere edge labels, but were not identified
as nodes in the network. See our literature review in Section 1. No such approach
would be able to capture the computational complexity we illustrate in this paper
because the liability graph of our hard instances is always trivial.
Property 3 help us discern the “origin of the complexity” from an economic point
of view. The holder of a CDS depends on two banks: the reference entity (this is
called fundamental risk) and the writer of the contract (this is called counterparty
risk; see D’Errico et al. (2018)). By property 3 however, unless the holder of the CDS
is highly capitalized, the recovery rate of the writer is fixed to 1 (up to ε errors) so
that counterparty risk is only the risk of ε errors. Thus, counterparty risk does not
significantly affect recovery rates.23The statement also holds for debt contracts. From
this, it follows that computational complexity persists if we neglect counterparty risk
and must therefore be driven by fundamental risk:
Proposition 2. All our complexity results (Theorems 1–4) still hold in a variant of
the clearing model where the assets of a bank i are defined as
ai(r) := ei +
∑
j∈N
c∅j,i +
∑
j,k∈N
ckj,i(1− rk).
The above modified model corresponds to a world where a governmental agency
like a central bank guarantees the payment in each and every contract while banks
are still in default if they cannot pay their obligations. A model where this is the
case for CDSs, but not debt contracts, and where our problems are still hard, was
23In Section 5, we have argued that errors at source banks can have a large impact because notionals
are large in the order of 1/ε. We have shown, however, that these errors do not have an impact
computationally because they do not significantly affect the outputs of our gadgets.
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studied by Leduc, Poledna and Thurner (2017).24 The proof of the above proposition
is by revisiting our gadget proofs and is omitted. The proofs become slightly easier
in the model without counterparty risk because we do not have to deal with ε errors
at the source bank any more.
Overall, we have seen now that the computational complexity illustrated in this
paper is not driven by counterparty risk, but by fundamental risk in CDSs. By
the second part of property 3, it is further driven by fundamental risk on the asset
side rather than the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. Mathematically, it does
not arise from non-linearity and must therefore arise from non-monotonicity (see
2.3; in the above model without counterparty risk and with all relevant liabilities 1,
the update function F is piecewise linear and weakly decreasing in the point-wise
ordering). To eventually receive a polynomial-time algorithm and thus bound the
complexity from above, it therefore seems promising to study structural restrictions
under which monotonicity is restored. This is what we do in the following.
6.2 Naked CDSs
Non-monotonicity of the update function emerges because a bank that holds a CDS
and no other contracts profits from an ill-being of the reference entity. Economically,
we say that it is short on the reference entity. This effect is only present when CDSs
are held by banks in a naked fashion, i.e., without holding a corresponding debt
contract from the reference entity. The opposite is called a covered CDS. In general
networks, we need to consider all potential CDS writers to define what a covered and
a naked CDS position are. We thus arrive at the following technical definition from
our prior work.
Definition 8 (Covered and Naked CDS Position; Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Bat-
tiston (2019)). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a financial system. A bank j has a covered
CDS position towards another bank k if
∑
i∈N
cki,j ≤ c∅k,j .
Otherwise, j has a naked CDS position towards k. X has no naked CDSs if no bank
has a naked CDS position towards another bank.
If j has a covered CDS position towards k and the recovery rate of k decreases,
then j may receive a higher payment in the CDSs it holds on k (this depends on the
recovery rates of the CDS writers), but it also receives a lower payment in the debt
contract from k and the latter effect weakly dominates. Hence, j can never profit
24Leduc, Poledna and Thurner (2017) also restricted their attention to covered CDSs, defined below.
This is why the computational problems that emerged in the context of their paper were not hard.
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from the ill-being of k. A covered CDS thus functions as an insurance against default,
while a naked CDS is often considered speculation on default.25
For an example for a financial system without naked CDSs, see Appendix A. This
also shows that it can still be the case that all solutions are irrational even without
naked CDSs, so we still need to consider an approximation problem still.
We have shown in our prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019)
that in a financial system without naked CDSs, the update function is point-wise
monotonically increasing and that this implies that a solution always exists and a
simple iteration sequence converges to a solution. It is easy to see that it does so in
polynomial time:
Theorem 6. For any financial system X = (N, e, c, α, β) without naked CDSs and
for any ε > 0, the iteration sequence (rn) defined by r0 = (1, ... , 1) and rn+1 = F (rn)
reaches an ε-approximate fixed point of the update function F after |N | · 1/ε steps. In
particular, this defines is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for
the total search problem of finding an ε-solution in a financial system with no naked
CDSs.
Proof. In each step where rn is not an ε-approximate fixed point of F , some component
rni must decrease by at least ε in the next step. This follows from the definition
of an ε-approximate fixed point and monotonicity of F . Since r is bounded below
by (0, ... , 0), there can be at most |N | · 1/ε such steps. This defines an FPTAS
because evaluating F and testing for an ε-approximate fixed point can obviously be
done in polynomial time and any ε-approximate fixed point of F is an ε-solution
(Proposition 1).
The above result extends to a slightly larger class of networks. In Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston (2019), we have defined a structure called the colored dependency
graph of a financial network. The nodes of this graph are the banks and an edge
i→ j exists whenever Fj(r) depends on ri (some of the edges may be false positives).
Naked CDS positions are colored red and all other edges are colored green. We have
shown in our prior work that, if no cycle in this graph contains a red edge, then
a solution is still guaranteed to exist and we receive an approximation algorithm,
essentially by iterating F on each strongly connected component in topological order.
Theorem 6 implies that this algorithm is an FPTAS for the no-red-containing-cycle
case.
25A covered CDS always acts as insurance, but a naked CDS need not be speculative per se. For
example, a bank may hold a naked CDS on an entity that has very strong ties with one of its debtors,
so that the CDS holder would still never profit from a default of the reference entity. It might also
act as a mere intermediary. Detecting and appropriately handling these “indirectly covered” CDSs is
a promising topic for future work, but beyond the scope of this paper.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the clearing problem in financial networks that consist
of debt and credit default swap (CDS) contracts. While in the debt-only case, the
clearing problem can be solved in polynomial time, we have shown in this paper that
the situation is markedly different if CDSs are allowed. Deciding if an (approximate)
solution exists is NP-complete and finding an approximate solution when existence
is guaranteed is PPAD-complete. In fact, already determining if a specific bank
defaults or finding a consistent set of defaulting banks are hard problems. Hardness
is preserved under various structural restrictions, but the case where no naked CDSs
are present allows an FPTAS.
We can now answer our original question: Are financial networks with debt
and CDSs “more complex” than those with only debt? Operationalizing informal
“complexity” as computational complexity of the clearing problem, we can conclude:
Yes, they are more complex, and in a precisely defined way so: understanding the
interactions between banks in financial systems with CDSs is at least as challenging
as understanding the structure of Boolean and generalized circuits. The complexity
prevents us from even knowing which banks default following a shock. Complexity
does not arise due to counterparty risk, but due to fundamental risk on the asset
side of banks’ balance sheets. If anything like a structural “origin” of the complexity
can be called out, it should be naked CDSs positions that occur as part of a cycle of
dependencies.
These insights are relevant for regulatory policy. The post-2008 regulatory reforms
related to the CDS market predominantly target counterparty risk. For example,
margin requirements mandate counterparties to keep a “buffer account” from which
fluctuations in the contract value are offset. Mandatory use of central counterparties
(CCPs) re-routes all contracts via a highly capitalized central node. Portfolio com-
pression eliminates cycles of liabilities for each individual reference entity.26 All of
these policies aim to reduce counterparty risk, but they do not affect fundamental
risk. CCPs and portfolio compression modify the network structure, but they leave
all reference entity–holder relationships of non-intermediaries as they are. Our results
from Section 6.1 imply that this does not eliminate the kind of complexity we reveal
in this paper.
Another policy that will likely not affect the hardness of our problems are regulatory
capital constraints. In our model, this would mean to require a minimum level γ ∈ [0, 1)
of external assets relative to maximum liabilities. Banks then have possible recovery
rates in [αγ, 1] rather than [0, 1]. We believe that it will be straightforward to modify
our constructions to re-map the latter to the former interval. This is why capital
26See Financial Stability Board (2017) for details on the different market reforms. Benos, Wetherilt
and Zikes (2013) provide an accessible introduction.
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constraints do likely not eliminate the complexity we describe.
What would eliminate the complexity, by our results from Section 6.2, is banning
all naked CDSs. This idea has been part of the public debate following the 2008 crisis
(see, for instance, Soros (2009) and Reuters (2009)). During the European sovereign
debt crisis in 2011, such a ban was in fact implemented for the subset of CDSs written
on sovereign states. The ban is in effect until this day (European Commission, 2011;
European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017).
The policy implications we describe here echo earlier results regarding existence
of a solution in Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019).
Since the structure of our hard instances is so simple, our results are robust to
changes to the details of the model. For example, our model abstracts over special
provisions in bankruptcy code that essentially give derivatives priority over other
contract types (debt in our model) in case of bankruptcy.27 As our constructions are
not affected by counterparty risk and, in fact, relevant banks only ever write a single
contract, priority is not relevant and our results persist. Our results do crucially
depend on the assumption that all contracts are cleared at the same time. That
is why they likely do not transfer to any variant of the dynamic clearing model in
Banerjee, Bernstein and Feinstein (2018) or to a multi-maturity model (Kusnetsov
and Veraart, 2019) when debt and CDSs mature at different points in time.
Future work should study which empirical properties of financial networks may
make the clearing problem with CDSs feasible. For example, if the number of reference
entities is small compared to the number of banks, we might be able to exploit the
fact that with recovery rates of reference entities fixed, the update function is linear
and monotonic. A similar approach may be feasible when the share of naked CDSs is
positive, but small. All of these properties are incompatible with the constructions in
our hardness proofs, which leaves hope that efficient algorithms might be available.
Another important topic for future work are practical algorithms that may not
have polynomial worst-case running time, but are fast in practice for realistic problem
sizes. Prior work has shown that nonlinear optimization solvers can be effective
tools in this regard (Rezakhani, 2018). Alternatively, it might be possible to find
fast combinatorial algorithms. For example, we might perform iteration over default
sets in a similar way to how the well-known Lemke-Howson algorithm performs
iteration over supports of strategies to compute a Nash equilibrium. By our results
from Section 5, any such algorithm would likely imply a combinatorial algorithm for
generalized circuits that iterates over discrete assignments.
27For details see, for example, Bolton and Oehmke (2015).
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Figure 11 Financial System where the unique solution is irrational. Let α = β = 1
(no default costs).
B C1
A
21
1 0
0
A Example That Financial Systems with CDSs May Have
Only Irrational Exact Solutions
Figure 11 shows a financial system the unique exact solution of which is irrational. To
see this, note that by the contract structure, ai(r) ≤ li(r) ∀r, i = A,B and therefore
r is clearing iff
rA =
rB
2 , rB =
1
2− rA ,
and rC = 1. One easily verifies that the unique solution in [0, 1]2 to this system of
equations is given by
rA = 1− 1√2 , rB = 2−
√
2.
B Comparison of our Generalized Circuit Definition to
Rubinstein (2018)
Rubinstein’s generalized circuits contain additional gates compared to ours. First,
there is a C= gate that simply copies its input and can of course be replaced by a
C×1 gate. Second, there are additional Boolean gates that operate on approximate
Boolean values.28 While we could represent Boolean operations in a financial system
using the gadgets from Section 3, Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) have shown in
prior work that the Boolean operations are in fact redundant and can be represented
using the comparison and arithmetic gates. To simplify our analysis, we omit these
gates.
The third difference to Rubinstein (2018) is that Rubinstein assumed a binary
comparison gate with two inputs where x[v] = 0± ε if x[a] < x[b]− ε and x[v] = 1± ε
if x[a] > x[b] + ε. One can emulate a binary comparison gate using our unary variant
such that ε increases only by a constant factor. To see this, construct a sub-circuit
28The definition of approximate Boolean values was weaker than what we did in Section 3, though.
See Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) for a discussion.
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corresponding to the expression(1
2 + (a− b)
)
− (b− a)
and call the output node u. Note that the order of operations matters due to
truncation at 0 and 1. Then add a C>1/2 gate with input u and output v. It follows
immediately from the gates that if x is an ε-solution, then x[u] = u˜± 5ε where
u˜ :=
[[1
2 + [x[a]− x[b]]
]
− [x[b]− x[a]]
]
=
[1
2 + x[a]− x[b]
]
.
Note that u˜− 1/2 = min (1/2, max (−1/2, x[a]− x[b])). From this, it follows that
for ε 1 (ε < 1/10 to be precise), v satisfies the definition of the binary comparison
gadget for ε′ := 5ε.
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